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What Economic Slowdown? 
Asia Looks at China
Deng Xiaoping’s advice in foreign aﬀ airs about “bid-
ing time,” “hiding capabilities” and “never claim-
ing leadership.” The former dimension is evident in 
the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, the call at 
the CPC Central Committee’s Third Plenum in 2013 
to let the markets play a “decisive role,” and the 
announcement of the restructuring of the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA). The latter aspect is seen in 
the greater assertiveness on territorial disputes in 
the East and South China Seas; Beijing’s willingness 
both to take an active role in existing multilateral or-
ganizations and create new ones, such as the BRICS 
New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank; and in such new initiatives as the 
‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) project.
China’s Asian neighbors are at the receiving end of 
this second set of developments. Whether these have 
come in spite of the slowdown or because of it – OBOR, 
If the slowdown in China started about 2011, then the 
assumption of leadership by Xi Jinping and his cohort 
at the 18th Party Congress of the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) in 2012 set in motion several signifi cant 
changes in direction, both domestically and external-
ly, in terms of the country’s political, economic and 
security policies.
For one, there seemed to be greater drive on display 
to achieve domestic reforms following the apparent-
ly “wasted decade,” as many Chinese now see it, of 
the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao tenure. For another, the 
Chinese leadership has also been willing to give up 
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Jabin T. Jacob is Assistant Director and Fellow at 
the Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS) in Delhi, India.
Asia PolicyBrief
Jabin T. Jacob
2  
Asia PolicyBrief | April 2016
In fact, a big plank of the Indian prime minister’s out-
reach to China since coming to oﬃ  ce in mid-2014 has 
been about increasing Chinese investments in India 
in critical sectors, such as road and rail infrastructure, 
and in the form of support for his government’s fl ag-
ship Make-in-India manufacturing campaign. Indeed, 
with Modi’s arrival it seemed for a while that the ini-
tial bonhomie of the Sino-Indian economic relation-
ship of the early 2000s was set to return. In those 
early years of takeoﬀ  in economic ties, India enjoyed 
trade surpluses, but these soon turned into persistent 
trade defi cits due to a skewed trade basket, since In-
dia mostly exports raw material and commodities and 
imports fi nished products from China. While Chinese 
investments in India have grown from US$16 million 
in 2007 to US$243 million in non-fi nancial invest-
ments and realized contract projects worth US$41.06 
billion in 2014, Indian investments  in China have 
grown from US$52 million in 2006 to US$564 million 
in 2014. Indian companies, however, fi nd it diﬃ  cult 
to win contracts in China because of various kinds of 
non-tariﬀ  barriers including the opaque legal struc-
ture there. This aﬀ ects Indian pharmaceutical and IT 
companies in particular. Chinese private players have, 
on the other hand, become major investors in Indian 
tech startups such as Alibaba in Paytm and Snapdeal, 
and Didi Kuaidi in Ola.
This, then, has added fuel to widely prevalent mis-
trust of China in New Delhi’s political and security 
establishments. And even Modi, with his success-
es soliciting Chinese investments as Gujarat Chief 
Minister, has failed to move the needle much so far, 
whether on the suspicion or on the defi cit. There 
were great expectations for Xi Jinping's September 
2014 visit to India, especially on the economic front. 
The Chinese consul-general in Mumbai had even 
touted a fi gure of US$100 billion in potential invest-
ments in India, but the visit ended up delivering only 
some US$20 billion worth of commitments. By con-
trast, the fi gure for Pakistan promised during Xi’s 
visit there in April the following year was more than 
twice the investments promised to India. Meanwhile, 
while three industrial parks specifi cally dedicated to 
Chinese investors are on the anvil in India, there has 
been little to no movement yet.
Elsewhere in South Asia, in Sri Lanka, despite an 
initial hiccup following the 2015 exit of Mahinda 
Rajapaksa, the country’s China-leaning president, 
the Colombo Port City project, a major Chinese ini-
tiative – and the largest foreign investment in the 
for example, is designed to shift or better employ 
China’s industrial and infrastructure overcapaci-
ty abroad – is largely immaterial to them, for they 
see both its positive and negative sides. As diﬃ  cult 
as it is for China to achieve the fi ne balance between 
achieving its regional and global interests and not 
being seen as a hegemon in the making, so it is also 
for its neighbors to partake of China’s economic ca-
pacity and bounty while simultaneously countering 
its political and security challenges. This policy brief 
will look at the interactions of some key Asian na-
tions with China in the context of both the centrality 
of China’s economy to Asian growth and its mili-
tary-backed assertiveness in the region.
China’s continuing economic might
To start with, opinion is divided on whether or not the 
economic downturn in China aﬀ ects India, China’s 
biggest rival in Asia in terms of size and potential com-
petition for leadership. In November 2015, Reserve 
Bank of India Governor Raghuram Rajan stated that 
while the Chinese slowdown had helped India some 
because of cheaper commodity prices, it had also re-
sulted in lower demand for some Indian exports to 
China. He also contradicted Indian Finance Minister 
Arun Jaitley’s declaration a month earlier that India 
had not been aﬀ ected by the slowdown since it was 
“not a part of the Chinese supply chain,” saying that in 
fact India “had been adversely aﬀ ected by the Chinese 
slowdown” given its close integration with the global 
economy. Earlier, Prime Minister Narendra Modi him-
self had called on Indian industry to seek opportunities 
both in China’s market and in light of its problems. 
However, the Indian manufacturing sector remains 
far from capable at the moment of exploiting the 
gap created by Chinese economic woes and in the 
wake of China’s renminbi devaluation in August. 
Furthermore, industry has called on Indian authori-
ties to ensure lower interest rates and to implement 
dumping duties against Chinese products. These 
demands mirror China’s own fi tful commitment 
to letting the market “play the decisive role in the 
allocation of resources,” as announced at the Third 
Plenum. A case in point here is China’s continu -
ing intervention in the foreign exchange markets 
to prop up the value of the renminbi. While both 
economies are in need of great structural reforms, 
these protectionist tendencies meanwhile aggravate 
political tensions as well. 
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Chinese exports to and imports from Asia 2014
Figure 1 | Source: UNCTAD Stat International Trade 2016
  Export in Million US$        Import in Million US$
Afghanistan
394 · 17,37
Brunei
1.746,81 · 189,72
Cambodia
3.275,45 · 481,94
Kyrgyzstan
5.242,70 · 55,35
Tajikistan
2.468,23 · 47,70
Sri Lanka
3.792,85 · 247,57
North Korea
3.520,41 · 2.867,70
Nepal
2.283,57 · 47,07
Bhutan
11,12 · 0,10
Laos
1.838,93 · 1.774,56
2.342.343,01 Mill. US$ · 1.958.021,30 Mill. US$
Worldwide export and import
South Korea
100.344,57 · 190.105,25
Taiwan
46.277,27 · 151.996,04
Thailand
34.293,36 · 38.326,38
Philippines
23.474,24 · 20.981,24
Indonesia
39.060,02 · 24.494,90
Malaysia
46.355,44 · 55.654,14
Singapore
48.911,90 · 30.809,93
India
54.220,38 · 16.358,78
Pakistan
13.246,45 · 2.755,36
Kazakhstan
12.712,08 · 9.739,79
Russia
53.675,38 · 41.619,14
Bangladesh
11.783,09 · 760,85
Myanmar
9.367,60 · 15.601,27
Japan
149.410,45 · 162.841,94
Vietnam
63.731,48 · 19.900,25
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Japan, too, has a robust economic relationship with 
China even as attacks on Japanese products and es-
tablishments have always occurred over the decades 
during China’s periods of foreign policy dissatisfac-
tion. The bilateral trade relationship, worth rough-
ly US$340 billion in 2014, is the third-largest in the 
world and China’s shift to higher-end manufacturing 
and to a more environment-friendly growth model 
will have to rely on Japanese high-technology trans-
fers. This, however, will also be a matter of political 
trust between the two countries – and of that there 
seems to be very little on display. 
In the meantime, the Chinese economy’s overtaking 
of the Japanese as the second-largest in the world – 
achieved during this period of slowdown – has sparked 
some Japanese angst as well as rethinking of the coun-
try’s political and economic direction. As in the case of 
Vietnam, some Chinese commentators have suggested 
that Japan is in a relationship of some dependency on 
China in view of the “crucial role” China plays in the 
prospects of Japanese enterprises and in light of the 
Chinese tourists helping lift Japan’s sagging economy.
That said, the changes in China – whether by design 
or as a result of the economic downturn – have also 
forced Japanese manufacturers to consider shifting 
production out of China to countries with lower wage 
and production costs. And after several decades of 
foreign policy drift in the region, Japan under Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe is also using this economic im-
perative to recover its importance in the Asian order 
by focusing attention and investments on Southeast 
Asia and emerging powers such as India. 
One Belt, One Road (OBOR)
One of the major manifestations of China’s self-con-
fi dence and creativity in the face of the econom-
ic downturn is its launch of the OBOR infrastructure 
development and investment initiative. This Chi-
nese plan has actually helped to divide opposition to 
China in many countries and/or provided additional 
incentive for other countries to deepen engagement 
with China. In India, for instance, policymakers view 
OBOR with great suspicion as some sort of Trojan 
horse, with potential security implications vis-à-vis 
India’s ties with its neighbors, while many analysts, 
pointing to India’s participation in the Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank (AIIB), have called on the 
government to adopt a more creative and fl exible ap-
country – appears to be back on track under the new 
president, Maithripala Sirisena. The importance 
of China to the Sri Lankan economy can be gauged 
from the fact that during the election campaign, 
even the opposition United National Party stated 
that its promised review of all major infrastructure 
projects to check for irregularities did not mean that 
there were “any misgivings or bad blood with Chi-
na,” but that it considered China “a good friend.” 
This feeling extends to the economic elite as well. 
The Ceylon Chamber of Commerce, for instance, in 
a statement after the elections declared that en-
hancing competitiveness and productivity in the Sri 
Lankan economy required deepening economic ties 
not just with India, but also with China and through 
a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Indian industry by 
contrast is strongly opposed to Chinese requests 
for an FTA with India. 
Moving to Southeast Asia, the region’s close inte-
gration with China in terms of the production and 
value chains is already quite well known. But China’s 
prowess is truly evident when one considers the case 
of its ties with Vietnam. Even as the two countries 
contend strongly over the Paracel and Spratly Islands 
in the South China Sea, China is now Vietnam’s largest 
trading partner and ninth-largest investor. At US$83.63 
billion as of February 2016, bilateral trade was up sub-
stantially from US$58.5 billion in 2014. About 10 percent 
of Vietnam’s exports – mainly food and natural resourc-
es – go to China. China is also Vietnam’s fi fth-largest 
source of overseas development assistance with the to-
tal, including preferential loans, coming to over US$395 
million as of June 2015, even if most of this is for the 
construction of a single urban rail project in Hanoi. 
As in the case of India, Vietnam’s trade defi cit with 
China has risen substantially from US$190 million 
in 2011 to US$ 32.3 billion in 2015 and to US$43.83 
billion as of February 2016 with no reversal in sight. 
Vietnam depends heavily on China for basic raw 
materials for many of its manufactured products, 
and also faces pressure from its dependence on 
China as a signifi cant consumer of its agricultural 
exports. China is the largest buyer of Vietnamese 
rice, and in April 2015 a general tightening of Chi-
nese inspections along the border meant that rice 
exports from Vietnam fell until September when 
Chinese buying picked up again. It is not surprising, 
then, that Vietnam has sought to widen its options 
by signing the US-led Trans-Pacifi c Partnership 
(TPP) in February 2016.
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In Bangladesh, China has committed to various 
physical infrastructure projects ranging from bridges 
and railways to water and sewage treatment plants. 
This includes a bridge over the Padma in Bangla-
desh’s southwest that is expected to add up to 1.2 
percent to Bangladeshi GDP. In Sri Lanka, in addition 
to the Colombo Port City, other big-ticket invest-
ments include a US$1.3 billion coal power plant and 
a US$1 billion highway.
While many of these plans are older than the an-
nouncement of OBOR, they are all now viewed under 
the rubric of the new Chinese initiative, just as the 
Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar (BCIM) Eco-
nomic Corridor announced during Chinese Premier 
Li Keqiang’s visit to India in May 2013 has now been 
subsumed under OBOR. OBOR, it must be remem-
bered, saw its fi rst oﬃ  cial iteration by Xi Jinping 
only in September of that year. It is possible to say 
proach. India’s neighbors, however, are by and large 
buying into the Chinese portrayal of the “new Silk 
Roads” as “a new form of global cooperation” and in-
novation, and as a source of “inclusive growth.” 
Pakistan is possibly the biggest benefi ciary of China’s 
economic largesse. The China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor signed during Xi Jinping’s visit to Islamabad 
in April 2015 is worth an estimated US$46 billion, of 
which some US$28 billion worth of agreements are 
intended for building roads, ports and power plants. 
The Pakistanis have largely been so enthusiastic 
about the promised Chinese largesse that they have 
fallen to bickering among themselves, arguing about 
the exact alignment of the Economic Corridor with 
some complaining of being denied a chance to par-
take of the benefi ts. Balochistan rebels meanwhile 
view the Corridor as an extension of Pakistani colo-
nialism and have threatened to disrupt it. 
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Despite Chinese provocations, many Southeast Asian 
countries will, however, also be reluctant to see the 
revival of the Japanese military or to ally too close-
ly with the United States, if that alliance is going to 
be backed by the same lack of congruence between 
words and actions as marks the Chinese case. Despite 
the recent American freedom-of-navigation oper-
ations in the South China Sea, the US is not taking 
sides in the disputes nor does it seem likely that it or 
anybody else will be able to stop China’s ongoing rec-
lamation activities.  Nor are the Southeast Asians in-
terested in precipitating confl icts that will aﬀ ect not 
just their economies, but also the stability of ruling 
regimes in many countries.
In Japan itself, China’s rapid military moderniza-
tion – fed by double-digit budget increases for several 
decades now – has caused consternation and in-
spired several moves to get around the constitutional 
strictures on a more “normal” role for the Japanese 
Self-Defense Forces. The creation of a National Secu-
rity Council in 2013 and several subsequent legislative 
initiatives have all implicitly had the Chinese threat 
as a driving force.
While Chinese weaponry is a minor part of South-
east Asia’s overall arms trade, the licensing and 
buying of Chinese weapons is a substantial part of 
the budgets of several countries in South Asia, no-
tably Pakistan, as well as a major policy instrument. 
This is the result of two factors: one, the history of 
Indian dominance and sometimes obnoxious behav-
ior vis-à-vis many of its smaller neighbors and, two, 
the history of Sino-Indian suspicion and competi-
tion starting with the countries’ brief border confl ict 
in 1962. Thus, as India’s antagonist, China is seen 
as a possible friend or ally by many sections with-
in several South Asian countries in their eﬀ orts to 
counter Indian pressures. India has responded to 
both this and Chinese incursions along their still 
disputed boundary with the decision to raise a new 
mountain strike corps in its army that is focused on 
China, and to deepen military engagement, espe-
cially in the maritime domain, with Japan and the 
US. India also did not take too kindly to the unan-
nounced visit of Chinese submarines to Sri Lanka in 
2014, which probably also solidifi ed its opposition to 
the Rajapaksa government.
China’s economic slowdown does not appear to have 
aﬀ ected China’s external military ambitions or its 
desire to put on a good parade. It organized the lat-
that the enthusiasm of Indian authorities for the Eco-
nomic Corridor has considerably cooled since then.
Southeast Asia is another region that has mixed feel-
ings about OBOR, in particular about the Maritime Silk 
Road. It is a sign of China’s remarkable confi dence 
that it should promote such ideas even as the South 
China Sea disputes involving several ASEAN members 
continue to fester. It cannot have escaped ASEAN’s 
notice that Beijing’s initiative is designed to draw it 
into a still tighter economic and strategic embrace 
with China, replicating, in fact, ASEAN’s own 2011 
Master Plan on Connectivity in many ways.
While Vietnamese suspicions are natural, it is also 
notable that Indonesian President Joko Widodo has 
put forward his own plan to make his country what 
he termed a “global maritime fulcrum.” As much a 
strategic economic initiative as OBOR, it has large-
ly been ignored by Chinese analysts even if oﬃ  cials 
have tried to highlight the complementarity of the 
Indonesian initiative with the Chinese Maritime Silk 
Road. In terms of regional or global recall value, how-
ever, the Chinese plan wins hands down. This is not 
surprising. China’s initiative comes on the back of 
a strong economy and promises tangible benefi ts to 
other countries, while Indonesia’s idea is still based 
only on the aspiration of a stronger economic and 
political role and faces issues stemming from lack of 
domestic capacity.
Territorial disputes and a widening 
military footprint
More than anything else, it is China’s assertiveness 
in the East and South China Seas that has convinced 
many of its neighbors that, slowdown or not, China 
remains a strong power, even threat, to be reckoned 
with. In the case of many countries such as India and 
Japan, this only confi rms existing fears about China, 
while ASEAN has turned into a divided house under 
pressure from the twin Chinese approaches.
The Chairman’s Statement at ASEAN Summits in re-
cent years has invariably expressed concern on the 
South China Sea disputes and indirectly criticized 
China, but the strength of the criticism has varied. 
While Vietnam continues to arm itself, it has not 
gone as far as the Philippines, which initiated inter-
national arbitration even though the Chinese have 
not being willing to participate.
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ter in August 2015 to mark the victory that ended 
World War II, an event that, in a pointed signal, was 
showcased as a victory over Japan and fascism and 
to which several Asian countries sent leaders and 
military contingents.  Cambodia and Laos sent both 
military units as well as their heads of state to parti–
cipate, as did Russia, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-
stan and Tajikistan, from China’s Eurasian neighbor-
hood, and Pakistan, from South Asia. Even Vietnam 
sent its president. For these and other countries, this 
was no doubt a way of thanking China for – and keep-
ing it interested in – continuing to disburse its eco-
nomic largesse.
Conclusion
As an analyst from a Chinese think tank speaking 
about China-Sri Lanka relations put it, no one would 
want to “miss the chance to catch the express train 
of China’s development.” Further, in cases such as 
Pakistan, the Chinese might even deserve credit for 
being willing to take on the onerous task of bringing 
development to one of the world’s most unsafe plac-
es. Nevertheless, China’s hard line on sovereignty 
disputes including the blatant disregard for interna-
tional law has raised suspicions of whether its eco-
nomic development programs in the form of OBOR 
are a disguise for political and security objectives. 
Nor does it appear that China’s economic slowdown 
has in any way moderated either China’s interest in 
building economic links with the outside world or its 
willingness to brandish its military might in terri-
torial disputes around the region. If anything, if the 
downturn gets worse, China’s leaders might rely still 
more on military threats to stoke nationalism and to 
defl ect attention from domestic problems.
China’s neighbors in Asia would not be surprised.
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